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1 Introduction
The debate over the architecture of a robust monetary union between countries attracted renewed
interest during the recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The asymmetrical nature of sovereign in-
terest rate shocks, coupled with the inherent constraints they pose on domestic ﬁscal policy, exposed
a painful fault in the design of the European Monetary Union (EMU). This fault concerns the lack
of adequate risk sharing mechanisms to facilitate the economic adjustments of individual member
states facing idiosyncratic shocks. As seen during the crisis, soaring sovereign spreads forced a num-
ber of countries, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, to undertake sudden ﬁscal
consolidation while implementing deep structural reforms. For the ﬁrst three cases, the extent of the
crisis required them to resort to institutional rescue programmes put in place by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Institutions. The dramatic economic toll of the crisis and
the dubious response from within the EMU called into question the irreversibility of the common
currency.
In this paper I propose a two-country model of a monetary union where sovereign spreads
aﬀect private borrowing costs due to ﬁnancial frictions. My contribution is twofold. First, I provide
a consistent narrative of the events during the sovereign debt crisis, illustrating how domestic ﬁscal
policy is constrained by the responsiveness of sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal conditions and by the
ratio of public debt to GDP. Second, I show that a simple ﬁscal transfer scheme between governments
is an eﬃcient buﬀer to sovereign spread shocks and discuss the conditions under which such a scheme
can be implemented.
During the sovereign debt crisis, banks were pivotal in passing the rise in sovereign spreads
to the real economy. The fall in government bond prices and the down-grading of these assets
by credit rating agencies severely weakened banks' balance sheets. As a consequence of their direct
exposure to sovereign credit risk, banks' ability to raise market-based funding was adversely aﬀected.
The increase in funding costs forced them to strengthen their equity ratios and to sharply reduce
overall credit provision to ﬁrms, which ultimately ignited the recession.
I capture the role of banks during the crisis by introducing a banking sector similar to that
proposed in Gertler and Karadi (2011) into a two-country general equilibrium model of a monetary
union. Banks serve as ﬁnancial intermediaries between households, from which they take short-term
deposits, and ﬁrms, to which they make long-term loans. Due to agency problems between banks
and their depositors, banks are forced to moderate their leverage in order to attract deposits from
households. I extend the banking sector by assuming that banks also lend to the government. In
good times, the sovereign obtains funds at the risk-free interest rate. However, a spread can arise
on top of the risk-free rate reﬂecting the credit worthiness of the government. Because banks hold
sovereign bonds in their portfolios, their net worth is exposed to sovereign credit risk. Therefore, a
shock to sovereign spreads deteriorates the equity value of banks and forces them to contract credit
supply and to raise lending rates at the same time as they retain funds to build up the value of their
net worth.
In the model, when the ratio of public debt to GDP is calibrated to 60%, I ﬁnd that a 10%
increase in sovereign spreads leads to an increase of about 3.5% in the borrowing costs for ﬁrms.
However, when the ratio of public debt to GDP equals 120%, the increase in private spreads is more
than three quarters of the initial rise in sovereign spreads. The drop in the supply of credit to ﬁrms
and the increase in borrowing costs adversely impacts investment and ignites the recession. At the
trough, real GDP falls between 2% and nearly 6%, depending on the size of the ratio of public debt
to GDP. These eﬀects are magniﬁed when sovereign spreads respond to the ﬁscal outlook. After the
initial shock, an increase in the public deﬁcit feeds back to sovereign spreads and further increases
ﬁrms' borrowing rates. The size of the feedback loop also has implications for ﬁscal policy. For
2
instance, for a public debt to GDP ratio of 120%, it is impracticable for the government to engage
in counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy as it is forced to consolidate in order to stabilize public debt and to
prevent sovereign spreads from rising further. As seen in the periphery of the EMU during the crisis,
when sovereign spreads are sensitive to the ﬁscal outlook, there is no leeway for the government to
provide a stimulus to the economy in order to countervail the recession.
The idea that the EMU should be completed with a federal ﬁscal arrangement is hardly
a novelty in policy and academic circles. When its design was being discussed, it was clear that a
system of ﬁscal transfers crafted to countervail idiosyncratic shocks would be crucial for the success
of the single currency.1 The argument behind a federal-like transfer mechanism drew directly on the
literature of optimal currency areas.2 With the creation of the EMU, member-states would no longer
be able to use monetary policy or the exchange rate to buﬀer country-speciﬁc shocks. Moreover, to
the extent that production factors are immobile across countries and movements in nominal prices
and wages are slow, ﬁscal policy would become a key instrument to fuel the necessary adjustments.
With this in view, the Maastricht Treaty incorporated limits on budget deﬁcits and public debts in
order to preserve sound domestic ﬁscal stances capable of reacting if required.
Yet, the political process aimed at endowing the EMU with an area-wide ﬁscal capacity lay
dormant for decades until the sovereign debt crisis when domestic ﬁscal policies failed to operate
the required adjustments. In response the severe consequences left by the crisis and the inability
of the EMU to respond adequately and promptly, the leaders of the European Institutions drew
up a road map to create an area-wide ﬁscal stabilization capacity. The proposed mechanism, to
be implemented before 2025, would be deployed when domestic ﬁscal policy cannot, on its own,
counteract large asymmetric shocks.3 In this paper, I examine the design and implementation of
such a federal ﬁscal capacity. I investigate the extent to which ﬁscal transfers can eﬀectively smooth
the eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks by considering a mechanism that aﬀects the ﬁscal stance of
the country. Because sovereign spreads constrain domestic ﬁscal policy, foreign transfers can step in
and both support economic activity and mitigate the ﬁscal burden.
I use the model to quantify the eﬀects on welfare of a cross-country ﬁscal transfer scheme
that is actioned in response to a widening in sovereign spreads. I ﬁrst show that in a monetary
union with equal-sized regions, there are unambiguous welfare gains from implementing the scheme.
Because transfers are processed between governments, they alleviate the ﬁscal burden directly. The
scheme proves to be particularly important in bad times when the public debt to GDP ratio is
high and sovereign spreads are highly responsive to the ﬁscal outlook. However, the distribution of
welfare gains is very sensitive to asymmetries between the two regions. Notably, I ﬁnd that, in order
to obtain positive welfare gains for all regions, the minimum relative size for the smaller region is
still higher than 48% of the entire union. This is an important challenge for the implementation of
the scheme: if some countries incur welfare costs, they will likely not participate.
1See, for instance, the MacDougall report (European Commission, 1977) as well as the Delors (1989) report.
2See the seminal articles by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969).
3The 5 Presidents Report (Juncker et al., 2015) is the last high level policy contribution. It draws on and updates
earlier proposals, namely by Van Rompuy et al. (2012). See also IMF (2013) for discussion.
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In order to provide a relevant and representative case study, I estimate the parameters of
the model for Portugal and the Eurozone. I limit the set of schemes I consider to those under which
potential welfare costs cannot exceed the welfare beneﬁts generated by the introduction of the single
currency. In other words, the alternative scenario to the transfers countries can compare to is the
status quo pre EMU. Considering the impact of the scheme in isolation, I show that Portugal can
secure welfare gains in the range of 1.44− 7.80% of lifetime consumption, while the Eurozone incurs
welfare losses of 0.03 − 0.15%. Because the scheme is designed in a way in which it excludes net
losses from entering the EMU, these results render strong support for its implementation. Regarding
the role of the transfers in mitigating the real eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks, I show that for a
level of transfers that reduces the pass-through of sovereign spreads in about 1/2 percentage points,
the trough of the recession is reduced by at least 1%. In bad times, the eﬀects generated by the
ﬁscal transfer scheme are considerably larger and, therefore, the dimension of the recession can be
eﬀectively reduced.
Literature: This paper is related to two strands of the literature. On the one hand, it relates to a
number of papers investigating the implications of sovereign spreads for economic stability. Schabert
and van Wijnbergen (2011) and Bonam and Lukkezen (2013), for instance, focus on the interactions
between ﬁscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, in an environment where sovereign spreads
are introduced as a preemptive game between the government and speculators. The parsimonious
way they model sovereign spreads is also used in the present paper. Corsetti et al. (2012), who
study how the sovereign risk channel exacerbates cyclical shocks in an environment where monetary
policy can be constrained at the zero-lower bound, analyse the eﬀects of ﬁscal retrenchment in
alleviating macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Bocola (2013) and Pancrazi et al. (2014) also investigate
the pass-through of sovereign risk to private borrowing costs and evaluate the eﬀectiveness of asset
purchases by the central bank in stabilizing real activity. Kollmann et al. (2013) introduce a banking
sector with capital requirements into an open economy model and investigate whether government
provision of support to banks can stabilize the economy. The present paper draws on this literature
of the pass-through of sovereign risk, but diverts from it by focusing on the implications it has on
ﬁscal policy itself and by considering instead cross-country ﬁscal transfers as a means to smooth
shocks.
On the other hand, this paper contributes to the literature on federal ﬁscal arrangements
within monetary union. There is a growing literature on optimal policy and international coordin-
ation using domestic ﬁscal instruments for countries sharing a common currency.4 However, less
attention has been given to federal ﬁscal schemes. Among the exceptions, Farhi and Werning (2012)
show that ﬁscal transfers can improve risk sharing in an environment with complete asset markets.
Costain and de Blas (2012) compare ﬁscal policy rules that stabilize public debt through either
income taxation or spending on wages and unemployment beneﬁts and ﬁnd that a policy of pro-
cyclical spending on wages and transfers decided by a federal agency brings the market economy
closer to the planner's solution. Kletzer and von Hagen (2000), Evers (2012) and Kim and Kim
4Evers (2012) and Pappa and Vassilatos (2007) provide references.
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(2013) investigate diﬀerent federal transfers schemes and their potential to achieve welfare gains for
members of a monetary union. I expand this literature by focusing on asymmetric shocks that not
only cause real ﬂuctuations, but also constrain domestic ﬁscal policy. Besides presenting an actual
scenario where federal ﬁscal arrangements can act as a stabilization mechanism, this paper adds to
the literature by quantifying and discussing the welfare trade-oﬀ such policies entail in a realistic
set-up.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I describe the model
and motivate the main extensions I have introduced. Section 3 discusses the estimation strategy and
the results I obtain. I dedicate section 4 to the policy analysis. I begin by investigating the dynamic
eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks in a baseline scenario. I then discuss how domestic ﬁscal policy is
constrained by the ﬁscal stance and by the behaviour of sovereign spreads. Finally, I investigate the
welfare consequences of the proposed ﬁscal transfers scheme and discuss its dynamic impacts during
episodes of sudden increases in sovereign spread. The last section concludes.
2 Model
In this section I lay out a general equilibrium model of a monetary union. The union is composed of
two small open economies with habits in consumption, sticky prices and wages, ﬁnancial frictions,
and investment adjustment costs. The model presented here is an extension of the one used by
Lama and Rabanal (2014). The two countries, which I call home and foreign, are of sizes n and
1−n, respectively. Households in each country deposit their savings in domestic banks and provide
labour to domestic producer ﬁrms. Households in one country can also trade bonds with house-
holds in the other country, having, however, to account for the real exchange rate. Banks serve as
intermediaries between households and borrowers. They sell long-term loans to wholesale ﬁrms and
to the government. Each country produces a continuum of tradeable intermediate goods that are
aggregated into a ﬁnal non-tradeable good. The latter is consumed by households, the government,
and used for investment. Governments can raise taxes and issue long-term bonds to ﬁnance public
expenditure, while the area-wide central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a feed-back
rule targeting aggregate inﬂation and output growth.
The following subsections describe the home economy in more detail. The description of
the foreign economy is omitted for brevity since its structure is analogous to the home country,
except for the government which is assumed to run zero ﬁscal deﬁcits every period.5 All variables
are in per capita terms, the conventional ? denotes foreign variables or parameters, and the subscript
h (f) denotes goods produced in the home (foreign) country and respective prices.
5Without loss of generality, I impose zero ﬁscal deﬁcits for the foreign economy for simplicity. When I compare
two symmetric regions in section 4, I mean total symmetry, that is, the foreign government is also allowed to issue
debt.
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2.1 Households
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households and within each household there are two types
of members: a fraction 1− f are workers and a fraction f are bankers. The former supply labour to
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and receive wages, while the latter manage a ﬁnancial intermediary for proﬁts.
Household members switch between the two occupations but keep the relative proportion of each type
constant. Hence, with probability λf a banker remains active in the following period, which implies
that each period a fraction (1− λf ) f bankers retire and become workers. Conversely, each period the
same number of workers randomly become bankers. Bankers' limited tenure avoids overaccumulation
of retained earnings and ensures the ﬁnancial frictions remain operative, as explained below.
Household members are assumed to pool consumption risk perfectly. Their life-time utility
is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ci,t, li,t) for i ∈ [0, n]
with
u (ci,t, li,t) = log (ci,t − %ct−1)− ζ (li,t)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
and where E0 denotes the rational expectations operator conditional on the information available
up to t = 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) is the household's subjective discount factor. Households derive utility
from consumption, which is subject to external habit formation % ∈ (0, 1), and disutility from
labour, where ϕ > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour supply and ζ > 0 its relative weight. The
consumption good is an aggregate good composed of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, as
explained below. Households can deposit their savings with domestic banks and can trade foreign
bonds in international ﬁnancial markets. The budget constraint of home households in real terms is
given by
(1 + τ ct ) ci,t + bi,b,t + etrf,t−1bi,f,t−1 ≤ wi,tli,t + rh,t−1bi,b,t−1 + etbi,f,t + Vt − Tt
(1)
where bi,b denotes deposits with domestic banks which pay the real interest rate rh,t−1, and bi,f
denotes bonds traded with households abroad and which pay the real interest rate rf,t−1. For ease
of exposition, the budget constraint is written such that bi,b > 0 implies positive savings from the
households, while bi,f > 0 implies that the household is a net borrower in international markets. As
a consequence of being in a monetary union, the nominal exchange rate between the two countries
is ﬁxed and therefore the real exchange rate, et, is simply equal to the ratio of consumer prices in
both countries. Households receive labour income at the real wage rate wi,t and real proﬁts from
ﬁrms denoted by Vt. Finally, they pay lump-sum and distortionary taxes, Tt and τ
c
t ci,t respectively,
to the government.
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The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption and for ﬁnancial asset holdings are
ςt =
1
(1 + τ ct )
1
ct − %ct−1 (2)
1 = βΛt,t+1rh,t (3)
1 = βΛt,t+1
et+1
et
rf,t (4)
where Λt,t+1 = ςt+1/ςt is the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption between t and t + 1, and ςt
is the multiplier on the budget constraint.
I introduce nominal rigidities in wages as in Erceg et al. (2000) by assuming that households
are monopolistic suppliers of diﬀerentiated labour services. As such, each household has market
power to negotiate wages with intermediate good producers. In turn, intermediate good producers
use a composite labour input in production, lt, which they obtain by aggregating diﬀerentiated
labour services according to
lt =
(∫ n
0
(li,t)
τw−1
τw di
) τw
τw−1
The demand curve for labour services from household i is thus given by
li,t =
(
wi,t
wt
)−µw
lt (5)
where wi,t is the real wage household i charges in order to supply li,t , and wt =
(∫ 1
0 (wi,t)
1−τw di
)1/(1−τw)
is the real price index of the composite labour input. The elasticity of substitution between labour
services supplied by diﬀerent households is given by µw.
In each period, only a fraction 1− λw of households can re-optimize their posted nominal
wage. When able to adjust its wage, household i solves
Max
wi,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλw)
s
[
log (ci,t+s − %ct+s−1)− ζ
(
li,t+s|t
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
subject to the respective demand curve for labour services and the budget constraint. The ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to the optimal nominal wage w∗t is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλw)
s ςt+sli,t+s|t
[
w∗t
Pt+s
− τw
τw − 1
ζ
(
li,t+s|t
)ϕ
ςt+s
]
= 0 (6)
where ςt is the multiplier on the budget constraint and li,t+s|t == (w∗t /wt+s)
−τw lt+s is the labour
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supplied in period t+ s for those households that last negotiated their nominal wage at t.
2.2 Banks
As described earlier, every period a fraction f of household members are bankers who run a domestic
ﬁnancial intermediary. I extend the banking sector described in Gertler and Karadi (2011) by
allowing banks to provide funds to the government. Hence, banks raise deposits from domestic
households and lend to domestic non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and to the government. As in Lama and Rabanal
(2014), bankers do not engage in cross-border deposits or investment activities.6 I also assume that
the domestic banking sector holds the total amount of public debt issued by the government.
I motivate these two assumptions with the following stylized facts. In 2011, around 80%
of the sovereign debt claims on countries in the periphery of the Eurozone was held in the balance
sheets of national banks. In these same countries, domestic government bond holdings accounted
for 93% of bank's equity. On the other hand, domestic banks represented roughly 75% of external
ﬁnancing to private ﬁrms. As a result, from 2008 to 2013, the lending volume of newly issued loans
fell by more than 50% in the periphery of the EMU.7
Therefore, each period a continuum of banks indexed by i ∈ [0, f ] obtain deposits bi,b,t from
households and lend funds to wholesale producers and to the government, ai,x,t and ai,b,t respectively.
Denoting by ni,t the net worth of ﬁnancial intermediary i and by Wi,t the total value of its assets,
the balance sheet of bank i is then given by
Wi,t = qx,tai,x,t + qb,tai,b,t = ni,t + bi,b,t (7)
where qj,t is the relative price of claims ai,j,t. The cost of deposits is given by the interest rate
rh,t, whereas banks require a return of rx,t on the loans they make to ﬁrms. The interest rate on
government bonds, rb,t, is assumed to equal the risk-free rate adjusted by a default risk premium δt.
Expanding (7) forward, I obtain the evolution of equity capital as the diﬀerence between earnings
on assets and interest payments on liabilities
ni,t = (rx,t−1 − rh,t−1) qx,t−1ai,x,t−1 + ((1− δt) rb,t−1 − rh,t−1) qb,t−1ai,b,t−1
+rh,t−1ni,t−1 (8)
Growth in equity above the risk-free return rh,t depends on the premium (rx,t − rh,t) earned on the
loans to ﬁrms and on the return on sovereign debt.
6Dedola et al. (2013) extend the framework of Gertler and Karadi (2011) to allow banks to take deposits from
foreign households and to lend to foreign ﬁrms.
7The ﬁgures were taken from Uhlig (2013), Acharya et al. (2014), and Bocola (2013). A report by the Bank for
International Settlements, BIS(2011), provides a comprehensive discussion on the link between sovereign credit risk
and banks funding conditions.
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The objective of bankers is to maximize their expected terminal net worth
Ni,t = E0
∞∑
s=0
(1− λf )λsfβs+1Λt,t+1+sni,t+1+s (9)
To the extent that the expected discounted returns on his assets are higher than the risk-free rate,
the banker will want to raise deposits and build its net-worth indeﬁnitely. Gertler and Karadi
(2011) introduce a moral hazard problem in order to limit overaccumulation of retained earnings
by assuming that at any given period bankers can divert a fraction ι of available assets. Having
knowledge of this, depositors can force the bank into bankruptcy, but can only recover the remaining
1 − ι of funds. Hence, depositors will only supply funds to the bank if the following incentive-
compatibility constraint is satisﬁed
Ni,t ≥ ιWi,t (10)
that is, the value of carrying on doing business must be higher than the value of diverting funds.
Absent ﬁnancial frictions, the risk premium on non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms would be zero. With imperfect
capital markets, however, the premium may be positive due to constraints on the ability of banks
to raise external funds.
I solve the banker's problem by deﬁning the leverage ratio of ﬁnancial intermediaries, φi,t,
as
Wi,t = φi,tni,t (11)
and by making an educated guess over the functional form of bankers' net worth. In particular, I
guess that Ni,t = νtWi,t + ηtni,t, where νt is the marginal value of expanding assets, holding ni,t
constant, and ηt is the marginal value of the bank's net worth, holding its portfolio Wi,t constant.
The expressions for νt and ηt are given by
ηt = E0Ωt,t+1rh,t (12)
νt = Ωt,t+1
(
(rx,t − rh,t)− (rx,t − rb,t (1− δt+1))αWt
)
(13)
where αWt = qb,tai,b,t/Wi,t is the share of government debt in the bank's portfolio. Ωt,t+1 is the
banker eﬀective discount factor which is given by
Ωt,t+1 = βΛt,t+1 {1 + θ [ηt+1 + νt+1φi,t+1 − 1]} (14)
The eﬀective discount rate of bankers diﬀers from that of the households due to the ﬁnancial friction.
As Gertler and Karadi (2011) show, when (10) binds the leverage ratio is common to all
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bankers and equal to
φt =
ηt
ι− νt (15)
That is, the amount of funds banks can intermediate is limited by their net worth due to the
borrowing constraint. For positive values of net worth, the constraint binds only if 0 < νt < ι. With
νt > 0, it is proﬁtable to expand Wi,t. However, if νt > ι, the incentive constraint does not bind
since the value from intermediation exceeds the gain from diverting funds. In the equilibria studied
below, the incentive-compatibility constraint always binds within a neighbourhood of the steady
state.
Finally, aggregate net worth in any given period is the sum of the net worth of existing
banks plus the start-up funds of entering banks. Surviving banks carry their total net-worth into
the next period, whereas new banks receive a fraction / (1− λf ) of the assets of exiting banks in
order to start business. Aggregate net worth is then given by
nt = λf
{[
(rx,t−1 − rh,t−1)− (rx,t−1 − rb,t−1 (1− δt))αWt−1
]
φt−1 + rh,t−1
}
nt−1
+ {qx,tax,i,t−1 + qb,tδtab,i,t−1} (16)
In the set up just presented, the share of government bonds in the balance sheets of banks,
αWt , is not an optimizing variable for bankers. I assume instead that the banking sector provides
funds to the government as the latter requires each period, without entering into optimal portfolio
choices.8 The appeal of this approach is that it gives me the ﬂexibility to introduce sovereign risk
in a transparent and parsimonious way. In particular, because I model sovereign default risk as a
preemptive game between the government and speculators, the pricing of government bonds is not
pinned down by banks.9 Hence, government bonds are priced according to
rh,t = Etrb,t (1− δt+1) (17)
that is, the sovereign interest rate is equal to the risk-free rate adjusted by the default risk premium,
which I describe shortly.
2.3 Production
Capital producers: At the end of each period, perfectly competitive capital producers buy
undepreciated capital from wholesale ﬁrms and repair it. At the same time, they also invest in
8For some references, Devereux and Sutherland (2007) describe how to implement optimal portfolio choice in an
open economy setting, while Dedola et al. (2013) apply this method to their model of banks with cross-border linkages.
Kollmann et al. (2013) assume that banks bear real costs on government and private bond holdings in order to pin
down their portfolio composition.
9Bocola (2013) develops a model similar to mine where the government can actually default on its debt, generating
a pass-through of sovereign risk to private borrowing rates. The strategic default literature is growing rapidly after
the seminal work by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), and includes Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arellano (2008), Cuadra
and Sapriza (2008), among many others. Two recent papers that expand this literature by including a banking sector
are Gennaioli et al. (2013) and Sosa Padilla (2014).
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new capital by purchasing and transforming domestic ﬁnal goods. The repaired and newly created
capital is then sold to wholesalers as an input to production. The discounted real proﬁts of capital
producers, ΠCP, are given by
Max
zt
Et
∞∑
s=0
βt+sΛt,t+s {qx,t+s (kt+s − (1− σ (ut)) kt−1+s)− zt+s}
where qx,t is the value of one unit of new capital, zt denotes the amount of ﬁnal goods that is
invested to generate new capital, and σ (ut) denotes the rate of capital depreciation, which depends
on capital utilization.
Capital producers are assumed to incur adjustment costs when investing in new capital.
The law of motion of capital is thus given by
kt =
[
1− ψ
2
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)2]
zt + (1− σ (ut)) kt−1 (18)
whit ψ governing investment adjustment costs. Substituting (18) in the objective function of capital
producers, the optimal level of investment is given by
1 = qx,t
(
1− ψ
2
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)2
− ψ
(
zt
zt−1
− 1
)
zt
zt−1
)
+βΛt,t+1qx,t+1ψ
(
zt+1
zt
− 1
)
z2t+1
z2t
(19)
Wholesale ﬁrms: Perfectly competitive wholesale ﬁrms use the composite labour input
and capital in order to produce a homogeneous good. They purchase capital from capital producers
at the real price qx,t, and ﬁnance their capital acquisition by borrowing from domestic banks. Banks
thus need to issue claims ax,t equal to the number of units of capital acquired kt, pricing each claim
at the price of a unit of capital. After production, wholesalers sell their capital to capital producers
and pay the return rx,t over their loans. The homogeneous good is sold to domestic retailers at the
real price px,t.
The production function of wholesale ﬁrms is given by
xt = ξ
s
t (utkt−1)
α (ξut lt)
1−α (20)
where ξst is the total factor productivity at home, ξ
u
t a drifting labour-augmenting technology com-
mon to both countries and α is the weight of capital in production. Following the discussion in
Albonico et al. (2014), I allow wholesalers to vary the eﬀective rate of capital utilization in produc-
tion, ut. However, a higher eﬀective use of capital increases its depreciation rate, as I assume that
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σ′ (ut) ≥ 0. The optimal utilization rate of capital satisﬁes
px,tα
xt
ut
= σ′ (ut) kt (21)
whereas the demand curve for composite labour services can be expressed as
wt = px,t (1− α) xt
lt
(22)
Perfect competition imposes zero proﬁts and therefore the ex-post real return paid to banks is given
by
rx,t−1 =
px,tαxt/kt−1 + qx,t (1− σ (ut))
qx,t−1
(23)
Retail ﬁrms: A continuum of retail ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0, n] purchase the homogeneous
good produced by wholesalers at the price px,t and diﬀerentiate it into a continuum of domestic and
foreign retail goods. Retailers follow a type of local currency pricing, so that prices vary depending
on the destination market. The diﬀerentiated goods they produce are sold to ﬁnal good ﬁrms at
home and abroad at the price pi,h,t and p
?
i,h,t, respectively. Hence, retailer i faces two demand curves
yi,h,t =
(
pi,h,t
ph,t
)−µp
yh,t and y
?
i,h,t =
(
p?i,h,t
p?h,t
)−µ?p
y?h,t (24)
from home and foreign ﬁnal good producers, respectively. Retail ﬁrms are subject to Calvo price
stickiness. Every period, a retailer is able to adjust prices in both markets with probability 1− λp.
When retail ﬁrms do not reoptimize prices, they simply update them to lagged inﬂation in the
destination market. Retail prices follow
pi,h,t+s =
 p∗i,h,t+sp∗i,h,t (Πsk=1pih,t+k−1)ϑ
with prob. 1− λp
with prob. λp
(25)
p?i,h,t+s =
 p
∗?
i,h,t+s
p∗?i,h,t
(
Πsk=1pi
?
h,t+k−1
)ϑ with prob. 1− λp
with prob. λp
where indexation is governed by ϑ ∈ [0, 1], which measures the extent to which prices fully adjust
to past inﬂation. When allowed to adjust prices, retailer i maximizes the stream of real discounted
proﬁts, ΠR (i), given by
Max
pi,h,t p
?
i,h,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βλp)
s Λt,t+s
{[
pi,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
pt+s
]
yi,h,t+s +
[
et+sp
?
i,h,t
pt+s
− px,t+s
pt+s
]
y?i,h,t+s
}
subject to (24) and (25). Due to diﬀerences in consumer price inﬂation at home and abroad, the price
of retail goods sold to foreigners needs to be adjusted by the real exchange rate et. The numeraire
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pt is the consumer price index. Solving for the optimal prices retailer i quotes in the two markets
yields
p∗i,h,t
ph,t
=
µp
µp − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+syh,t+s
px,t+s
pt+s
(
ph,t
ph,t+s
(Πsk=1pih,t+k−1)
ϑ
)−µp
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+syh,t+s
ph,t+s
pt+s
(
ph,t
ph,t+s
)1−µp (
Πsk=1pih,t+k−1
)ϑ(1−µp)
(26)
and
p∗?i,h,t
p∗h,t
=
µ?p
µ?p − 1
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+sy
?
h,t+s
px,t+s
pt+s
(
p?h,t
p?h,t+s
(
Πsk=1pi
?
h,t+k−1
)ϑ)−µ?p
Et
∑∞
s=0 (βλp)
s Λt,t+sy?h,t+s
et+sp?h,t+s
pt+s
(
p?h,t
p?h,t+s
)1−µ?p (
Πsk=1pi
?
h,t+k−1
)ϑ(1−µ?p)
(27)
Although the elasticities of substitution between retail goods consumed domestically and exported,
µ and µ?, can vary, the parameters reﬂecting the degree of nominal rigidity λp and ϕ are common
to domestic and export inﬂation.
Final good producers: Perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce a non-tradeable ﬁnal good
by aggregating a continuum of domestic and foreign intermediate goods. The aggregation technology
for the ﬁnal good is given by
yt =
[
($)
1
γ (yh,t)
γ−1
γ + (1−$) 1γ (τyf,t)
γ−1
γ
] γ
γ−1
(28)
where τ ≡ (1− n) /n normalizes the amount of imported goods into per capita terms. In the above
CES aggregator, the home-bias parameter $ denotes the fraction of goods produced at home that
is used in the production of the ﬁnal good. The elasticity of substitution between home-produced
and imported intermediate goods is given by γ.
The two composite goods, yh,t and yf,t, are an ensemble of domestic and foreign retail
goods which are aggregated using a technology given by
yh,t =
(∫ n
0
(yi,h,t)
µp−1
µp di
) µp
µp−1
and yf,t =
(∫ 1
n
(yi,f,t)
µp−1
µp di
) µp
µp−1
where µp denotes the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced in each country.
These two expressions give rise to the price indices ph,t and pf,t of the composite goods.
Final good producers maximize proﬁts ptyt−ph,tyh,t−pf,tτyf,t each period, subject to (28).
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The resulting optimal demand functions are given by
yh,t = $
(
ph,t
pt
)−γ
yt (29)
yf,t = (1−$)
(
pf,t
pt
)−γ n
1− nyt (30)
The consumer price index, pt, is obtained by replacing yh,t and yf,t in (28) with the respective
demand function, which implies
pt =
[
$ (ph,t)
1−γ + (1−$) (pf,t)1−γ
] 1
1−γ
(31)
2.4 Government
The government levies lump-sum and consumption taxes, Tt and τ
c
t , and issues sovereign bonds
dg,t to ﬁnance exogenous non-productive government consumption gt of the domestic ﬁnal good.
Government debt is entirely held by domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries, which are assumed to provide
the government with the amount of funds it requires. Hence, in the aggregate, the number of claims
held by banks must equal the total amount borrowed by the government, ab,t = dg,t.
Government expenditure is given by the following rule
gt = (g¯)
1−ρg (gt−1)ρg
(
gdpt
gdp
)κg
εgt (32)
where kg governs the response of public expenditures to the cycle. In turn, lump-sum taxes are set
according to
Tt = T
(
dg,t−1/gdpt−1
d˜g
)κτ
(33)
where κτ characterises the government's preferences between tax- and debt-ﬁnanced expenditures
and d˜g is the target level for the stock of debt as a percentage of GDP. The tax rule embedded in
(33) represents the eﬀort the government needs to make, via taxes, to maintain public debt away
from an explosive path. In order to induce a direct cost in terms of welfare derived from raising
taxes, I follow the discussion in Kim and Kim (2013) and let the tax rate on consumption vary
depending on the eﬀort the government makes to control public debt. Hence, distortionary taxation
is deﬁned as
τ ct ct = κcTt (34)
where κc is the share of consumption taxes in the total tax revenue of the government.
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I follow Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2013) and Bocola (2014), and assume that the govern-
ment issues long-term securities. Each period, government bonds mature with probability λb, which
implies an average duration of bonds of 1/λb periods. When bonds reach maturity, the government
pays back the principal; otherwise investors receive the coupon µb and retain the right to obtain the
principal in the future. The government's ex post budget constraint is therefore given by
(λb + (1− λb)µb) dg,t−1 + gt = Tt + qb,t (dg,t − (1− λb) dg,t−1) (35)
where qb,t is the price of loans to the government. Conversely, the return on government bonds is
given by
rb,t−1 =
λb + (1− λb) (µb + qb,t)
qb,t−1
(36)
I deﬁne sovereign default in a manner similar to Schabert and Wijnbergen (2011) and
Corsetti et al. (2012) by assuming that the government's decision to default depends on a ﬁscal
limit above which the ﬁscal burden is deemed to be politically unacceptable.10 Sovereign spreads
are generated as the result of a preemptive game between the government and speculators. Agents
know the distribution f (·) of the ﬁscal limit and form their expectations on that basis. Our modelling
choice is not innocuous however. On the one hand, I abstain from a complete characterization of
strategic default, which is beyond the scope of this paper, and instead assume that the ﬁscal limit is
stochastically determined.11 On the other hand, I abstract from any distributional consequences of
default, including its eﬀects on the ﬁscal stance. In fact, actual default is neutral, as can be deduced
from expression (35), in the sense that I do not consider de facto asset losses in the model. Instead,
the probability of default is crucial for the dynamics of sovereign bond prices and, consequently,
for the net worth of banks. Hence, the model attempts to provide a consistent characterization
of asset dynamics, but is mute with regards to the decision of actually declaring default and its
consequences.12
Every period the ﬁscal limit, or the politically bearable maximum level of the tax burden
or of the public debt, is drawn from f (st). The probability of default is equal to the probability
the ﬁscal stance exceeds the ﬁscal limit. Let ∆ (st) be a default indicator equalling 1 when the
ﬁscal stance goes beyond the ﬁscal limit, and zero otherwise. As shown in Schabert and Wijnbergen
(2011) and Bonam and Lukkezen (2013), I can approximate the expectation over the probability of
10Davig and Leeper (2010) introduced the notion of ﬁscal limit used here.
11Corsetti et al. (2012) provide some motivation for this assumption by appealing to political considerations
surrounding the decision to declare default. A previous note already made useful references to the literature on
strategic default.
12Gertler and Karadi (2011), Dedola et al. (2013) and Lama and Rabanal (2014), just to name a few recent works,
explore the eﬀects of capital shocks that aﬀect the actual quantity of assets in general equilibrium models with banks.
The crucial diﬀerence between shocks to the stock of capital and shocks to its price lies on the real eﬀects of reducing
eﬀective capital in production.
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default by
δˆt =
(
Θ/δ
)
sˆt + ε
d
t (37)
where  denotes ﬁrst-order log-linear approximations, st is the ﬁscal stance, ε
d
t is an exogenous shock
that captures the market's perception regarding the possibility of a sovereign default and s is pinned
down in the steady state. The parameters Θ denotes the elasticity of the probability of default with
respect to changes in the ﬁscal stance, that is ∂∆ (st) /∂st. I intentionally left the ﬁscal stance st
undeﬁned in (37) for there are various potential candidates for the most adequate measure. The
expressions ﬁscal stance and ﬁscal outlook, which I use interchangeably in this paper, refer not only
to the present ﬁscal conditions (as measured by the public deﬁcit, the tax burden or the share of
government expenditures to GDP, to name a few), but also, and probably more importantly, to the
future sustainability of current ﬁscal policy (as measured, for instance, by the ratio of public debt
to GDP). I have experimented with the ratio of public debt to GDP, as in Schabert and Wijnbergen
(2011), and with a measure of the ﬁscal strain, as in Corsetti et al. (2012). Both produce similar
outcomes and here I show the results for st = dg,t/gdpt.
2.5 Central Bank
The single central bank in the monetary union is assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule where the
nominal interest rate responds to the aggregate consumer price index and to the area-wide real GDP
growth according to
i?t =
(
i
?)1−ρi (
i?t−1
)ρi (( p˜it
p¯i
)ρpi ( ˜gdpt
˜gdpt−1
)ρg)1−ρi
εit (38)
where ρi ∈ (0, 1) is the smoothing parameter, ρpi and ρg are the usual response coeﬃcients. The
nominal interest rate is given by the Fisher equation
r?t =
i?t
pi?t+1
I have assumed the foreign nominal interest rate to be the policy instrument given the small size
of the home country I consider in the next sections. The aggregate variables in the Taylor rule are
denoted with a ∼ and are the sum of the respective country variables weighted by their population
size.
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2.6 Market Clearing
There are two types of markets for goods in each country that must clear in equilibrium. For
intermediate goods, production by the wholesaler ﬁrms equals demand by retailers
xt = Υh,tyh,t + Υ
?
h,ty
?
h,t (39)
Note that, due to price dispersion, retailers incur real losses during price setting. On the other
hand, the non-tradeable domestic ﬁnal good is sold to households, the government and to capital
producers
yt = ct + zt + gt (40)
From the aggregate budget constraint of households I obtain the following law of motion
for net foreign assets
et (rf,t−1bf,t−1 − bf,t) = etp?h,ty?h,t − pf,t
1− n
n
yf,t (41)
where y?h,t are exports of the home-produced intermediate composite good and yf,t are imports of
the foreign-produced intermediate goods.
Because ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and
ensure the model is stationary by setting rf,t equal to the real interest rate abroad plus a risk
premium that is sensitive to the total net foreign asset position as a percentage of GDP
rf,t = r
?
tΞexp
{
Γ
(
et
bf,t
gdpt
− b˜f
)}
(42)
and where GDP is deﬁned as
gdpt = ph,tyh,t + etp
?
h,tyh,t (43)
3 Bayesian Estimation
In this section I estimate the model for Portugal and the Eurozone. Portugal is an illustrative
example of a country that has been subject to considerable shocks to its sovereign interest rates. In
the spring of 2011, Portugal became the third EMU member to request external ﬁnance assistance,
after Greece and Ireland. At the time, the Portuguese government was facing a sharp increase in
the costs to ﬁnance public debt, while Portuguese banks, heavily dependent on external ﬁnancing,
were being cut-oﬀ from market-based funding. When the assistance programme was signed in April,
the 10-year yield of Portuguese government bonds were rapidly approaching the 10% mark, public
debt to GDP was around 110%, and the ﬁscal deﬁcit had reached 11.2% the previous year. With
the program, Portugal received ¿78 billion, or about 43% of GDP, under the conditionality of
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implementing measures towards ﬁscal consolidation and pursuing structural reforms.13
I estimate the model using standard Bayesian techniques. First, the equilibrium conditions
are log-linearised around a deterministic, zero-inﬂation steady state. As I explain in more detail, I
reduce the number of parameters to estimate by calibrating some that are weakly identiﬁed by data.
For the remaining parameters, I specify the priors for estimation based on previous studies. I then
employ the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with two chains of 125.000 draws to obtain the posterior
distributions.14
3.1 Calibrated Parameters
The parameters I calibrate can be arranged into four diﬀerent groups. The ﬁrst group includes
those usually calibrated in the literature and for which I pick consensual values. The second group
contains the parameters related to the banking sector, which are not estimated because of the lack
of long and reliable data series I could use to identify them. Regarding these two sets of parameters,
I further impose their values to be equal across countries. The parameters that pin down steady
state ratios constitute the third group and their values are chosen to match long-run averages in the
data. Finally, the parameters at the core of the policy analysis in section 4 form the forth group.
Table 1 reports the values for the calibrated parameters. Hereafter, the home country
represents Portugal, the Euro Area is the foreign country, and one period in the model corresponds
to one quarter. The values for the ﬁrst set of parameters are mostly taken from Lama and Rabanal
(2014). The exception is the elasticity of capital depreciation with respect to utilization, for which
I use the estimate obtained by Albonico et al. (2014). The values for the parameters related to the
banking sector are taken from Gertler and Karadi (2011). Lama and Rabanal (2014) and Bocola
(2013) estimate some of these parameters and obtain very close estimates to the values used here.
On the other hand, the spread on the sovereign interest rate is only meant to be illustrative and
therefore I assume a relatively small value, below the one used by Schabert and Wijnbergen (2011)
and more in line with what the data from before 2009 suggests.
Regarding the third group, I set the share of the population living in Portugal to 3% of the
total of the Eurozone; the ratio of per capita GDP between the EMU and Portugal to 1.7; and the
share of imports to GDP in Portugal, which corresponds to 1 − ω in the model, to 30%. Plugging
these ﬁgures into the steady state version of the demand equations for ﬁnal goods in both countries
and using the aggregate resource constrain, I obtain an extremely high degree of home bias in the
Euro Area (ω? = 0.995). Hence, while Portugal is relatively sensitive to shocks pertaining to the
currency area, the Eurozone is almost immune to shocks originating in Portugal. Although the
degree of openness of the Eurozone is undoubtedly higher than the one implied by my calibration,
13Figures and further discussion about the Portuguese adjustment program can be found in a report by the European
Commission of 2014.
14The non-linear equilibrium conditions of the model where coded in Dynare 4.4.2, with the model's solution,
estimation and welfare analysis being performed using Dynare's interface. Estimation was performed under a ﬁrst-
order log-linear approximation, whereas the welfare analysis was done on a second-order log-linear approximation to
the model's equilibrium conditions.
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I nevertheless decided to stick to these values to guarantee the consistency of the estimates for
Portugal.15
For the policy parameters, I decided to be rather conservative and followed the standard
calibration used in the literature. The ratio of public debt to annual GDP is set equal to the upper
limit imposed by the Maastricht Treaty of 60%, which is close to the sample average for Portugal
when I exclude the last half decade. I assume a standard AR (1) process for government expenditures
and set κg = 0 . For the share of consumption taxes in the total taxation, I set κc equal to 40%
based on Eurostat (2014). I then obtain a steady state eﬀective tax rate of τ css = 16.58%, which
is slightly below the estimates computed in Eurostat (2014), but in line with the estimate used by
Kim and Kim (2013).
3.2 Data and Priors
I use a sample of 14 quarterly time series - 7 for each region - spanning between the ﬁrst quarter
of 1995 and the last quarter of 2014. I use nominal GDP, household consumption, investment,
government expenditures, compensation of employees, the consumer price index and a nominal
interest rate I deﬁne shortly. National accounts data for Portugal is taken from the Eurostat,
whereas for the Euro Area I use the ECB Area Wide Model. Because Portugal accounts for just 3%
of the currency area, it seems unlikely that using aggregate data for the entire Eurozone, including
Portugal, constitutes a signiﬁcant source of estimation bias. I obtain consumer prices from the
ECB (I use the HICP indices). I use the 10-year government bond yield from the Eurostat for
Portugal16 and choose the Euribor 3-month series from the ECB for the Euro Area. All variables
are already seasonally adjusted from the source except for consumer prices, which are adjusted using
the X-13ARIMA procedure developed by the US Census Bureau.
To be consistent with the model, I convert the national account aggregates into per capita
quantities using quarterly population series from the Eurostat. The same is done for wages, which I
obtain dividing compensation of employees by the number of employees, also from the Eurostat. The
reason behind using nominal variables relates to model consistency as well. Given that all aggregates
have the same deﬂator in the model, I ensure the resource constraints in each region are met by using
the consumer price index to convert all nominal quantities into real variables. Lastly, I take logs and
15Some notes are in order. First, the value for ω? is perfectly consistent with the way I model the monetary union:
Portugal represents indeed a very small share of Eurozone trade. Second, the mismatch of ω? with the data has two
sources. On the one hand, I do not model countries outside the EMU, despite the large share they represent in terms
of trade ﬂows with the Eurozone. On the other hand, aggregate trade data for the Eurozone includes exports and
imports within member states, magnifying the ﬁnal values of net-exports. Third, because I use aggregate data for the
Eurozone, parameter estimates need to be analysed with caution. There are a number of studies running Bayesian
estimation for the Eurozone and using the same data set, which allows me to compare and evaluate the results I
obtain here. On the contrary, given that previous estimates for Portugal are rare, I decided to use a calibration that is
as consistent as possible with Portuguese time series in order to minimize the chances of obtaining blurred estimates.
Fourth, as I discuss later, I add measurement errors to the net exports of both countries to minimize the potential
bias caused by the calibration and study the robustness of the estimates I obtain.
16Accordingly, I set λb = 0.025, which implies an average maturity of government bonds of 40 quarters, and calibrate
the value of the coupon, µb, such that in the steady state the price of government bonds equals the price of loans to
ﬁrms, qb = qx .
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ﬁrst diﬀerences of real quantities and wages in order to render them stationary. With one exception
though: Portuguese government expenditures remain non-stationary after these transformations. I
therefore use the share of government expenditure to GDP and implement the corresponding changes
in the model. Regarding the nominal variables, I obtain consumer price inﬂation by taking logs and
ﬁrst diﬀerences of the price level series and divide the nominal interest rates by 400 to convert them
to quarterly series. I use nominal interest rates in levels because they are stationary both in the
data and in the model. Finally, all variables are demeaned before estimation.
Due to the inclusion of a world technology shock with a unit root, real quantities and wages
are also non-stationary in the model. Consequently, I divide these variables by the level of world
technology and match actual variables to their model counterpart by noting that ∆yot = ∆y˜t + ε
u
t ,
where ∆yot corresponds to the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the log of observable real variables, ∆y˜t is the growth
of its counterpart in the model (y˜t denotes the detrended log-deviations from the steady state), and
εut the innovation to the stochastic trend in logs. In total, I match the following 14 variables: ∆gdpt,
∆gdp∗t , ∆ct, ∆c∗t , ∆zt, ∆z∗t , ∆gt, ∆g∗t ,∆wt, ∆w∗t , pit, pi∗t , ib,t, and i∗t .
I deﬁne the prior distributions based on the literature preforming Bayesian estimation of
DSGE models of the Euro Area. In particular, I focus on studies that use the same dataset for
the Eurozone as the one used here. Given that the literature on Portugal is comparatively less
proﬁcuous, I decided to have prior distributions for Portuguese parameters identical to their Euro
Area counterparts. Nevertheless, due to the signiﬁcantly higher volatility of Portuguese time-series,
I let the priors for the standard deviations to be generally more diﬀuse than in previous studies.
Prior distributions are shown in Table 2 to Table 4.
I use the gamma distribution for parameters assumed to be positive. Priors for the habit
parameters and for the labour disutility coeﬃcient are taken from Lama and Rabanal (2014). I let
investment adjustment costs to vary across regions and set its prior mean to 2. For parameters
bounded between 0 and 1, I use the beta distribution. I use the same prior distribution for price and
wage lotteries as Smets and Wouters (2002). They set the prior mean to 0.75, which implies average
contract durations of one year. For the price indexation coeﬃcient, I set prior means of 0.20, which
is in line with the estimates found in previous studies. The prior for the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the
Taylor rule follows a normal distribution centred at 1.7 as in Smets and Wouters (2002), while the
prior mean for the coeﬃcient on output growth is set at 0.20, which is within the range of values
typically used. I proceed in the same way and set the prior means of the smoothing coeﬃcient in the
Taylor rule and the persistence of shocks to 0.75, which lies between the 0.5 and 0.85 found in the
literature. The prior distributions for the standard deviations of the shocks are again based on Lama
and Rabanal (2014), although relatively more diﬀuse for the reason mentioned above. The prior
mean for the standard deviations of intratemporal preference shocks is signiﬁcantly higher than for
the remaining shocks, which is also the case in Smets and Wouters (2002). Also worth noting that
technology and cost-push shocks are assumed to be less volatile than investment speciﬁc shocks, but
more volatile than intertemporal preference shocks.
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3.3 Estimation Results
Table 2 and Table 3 show the posterior means and the 90% credible set of the estimated paramet-
ers.17 The baseline estimates can be found under spec. 1. Looking ﬁrst at the estimates for the
Eurozone, the posterior mean for the habit persistence and the labour disutility parameters are
identical to those found by Smets and Wouters (2002). Regarding nominal rigidities, I ﬁnd that
price contracts are, on average, shorter than wage contracts. The mean estimates are very close to
those in Lama and Rabanal (2014), with prices adjusting every 3 quarters on average while wages
take 5 quarters. In general, the estimates for Portugal diﬀer by little from their Euro Area counter-
parts. Among the exceptions is ψ, found to be signiﬁcantly higher, and the survival rates of nominal
contracts, with prices adjusting more slowly than wages. The estimates for price indexation are
small for both regions and around 10%, which is in line with what Lama and Rabanal (2014) obtain.
Finally, our estimates for the area-wide Taylor rule are also very similar to those in the literature.
Regarding the shock processes, I estimate intertemporal preference shocks to be more per-
sistent compared to intratemporal (or labour supply) shocks, a result also obtained by Adolfson et
al. (2007) and Lama and Rabanal (2014). On the contrary, the persistence coeﬃcients of stationary
technology, investment speciﬁc technology, and cost-push shocks are relatively lower than what is
found in the literature. Government expenditure shocks both in Portugal and in the Eurozone ap-
pear to be quite persistent and very similar to the values estimated by Smets and Wouters (2002),
while the coeﬃcient on the risk premium is in line with Adolfson et al. (2007). The estimates for the
standard deviations reported in Table 4 are generally in line with our prior expectations. Comparing
both regions, Portuguese shocks are systematically more volatile than Euro Area ones, and this is
particularly visible for investment speciﬁc technology and cost-push shocks.
While I only model trade between the two regions, Eurozone countries have multiple trading
partners and, inclusively, trade with regions outside the monetary union. Hence, the aggregate
resource constraint in the model is inconsistent with actual national accounts for it excludes exports
and imports vis-à-vis regions outside the model. This is particularly troublesome given that Portugal
accounts for only a slim fraction of total net exports originating in the Euro Area. In order to account
for trade other than between the two regions, I added measurement errors to the net exports in
the model. I compare this methodological choice to the approach taken by Lama and Rabanal
(2014), who estimate the model without measurement error and without including government
expenditures in the set of observables. The results, reported under spec. 2, show virtually no changes
in parameter estimates except for a smaller persistence of Portuguese government expenditures and
a higher volatility of Portuguese and Euro Area government expenditure shocks. It thus seems that
government expenditures are not only capturing actual shocks to public spending, but also residual
volatility coming from trade outside the model. I also explore the impact of misspeciﬁcation when
I include government expenditures to the set of observables without adding measurement error to
net exports. Not only the parameter estimates deliver very diﬀerent results, as can be seen under
17The estimation results shown here were obtained holding capital utilization and consumption taxes ﬁxed and
equal to their steady state values. Further work is being undertaken to allow these features to vary during estimation.
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spec. 3, I also ﬁnd a striking mismatch between the volatility of the observable time series implied
by the model and actual ﬁgures.
Turning to the second moments, the ﬁrst two columns of Table 5 report the standard
deviations the data and those implied by the model evaluated at the posterior mean under to the
baseline estimation. The match is satisfactory for most variables, with two exceptions. On the one
hand, Eurozone GDP is predicted to be more volatile, a result that is also obtained by Lama and
Rabanal (2014). On the other hand, the model delivers a smaller standard deviation of Portuguese
wages despite the high estimated volatility of labour supply shocks. Note also that, although in the
data the volatility of Portuguese GDP is only slightly smaller than the volatility of consumption,
the model delivers the inverse ordering, with GDP predicted to be more volatile.
Table 5 also presents the unconditional variance decomposition of the variables I use for
estimation. I have aggregated some shocks in order to make the presentation neat.18 Similarly
to Lama and Rabanal (2014), the international transmission of shocks appears negligible for most
variables, apart from Portuguese inﬂation and the sovereign interest rate. Regarding the former,
this ﬁnding indicates that shocks in the Eurozone feed mostly through prices and do not have a
signiﬁcant direct impact in real quantities. On the other hand, as sovereign spreads are exogenous
in the baseline scenario, the sovereign rate is mostly explained by spread shocks themselves and by
foreign shocks which feed through the common Taylor rule. Interestingly, sovereign spread shocks
have negligible eﬀects in the real economy, a result that does not seem to have been inﬂuenced by the
events taking place in the very last part of the sample. In line with Ratto et al. (2008), I also ﬁnd
that monetary policy shocks explain only a small fraction of the volatility of Euro Area variables.
All in all, and similarly to previous studies, preference and technology shocks represent the main
source of ﬂuctuations in both regions.
4 Sovereign Spreads and Fiscal Transfers
In this section, I start by analysing the transmission mechanism of sovereign spread shocks in the
model and by assessing its conformity with actual events during the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal.
In the context of asymmetric shocks within a currency area, as have been sovereign risk shocks in
the Eurozone, ﬁscal policy becomes a crucial tool to stabilize the economy. I show, however, that
sovereign risk and the ﬁscal outlook of a country constrains the set of actions of the government. I
then run a number of policy experiments exploring the possibility of a new ﬁscal architecture within
the EMU. In particular, I analyse the potential beneﬁts of implementing a ﬁscal transfers scheme
(FTS) among Eurozone member-states. Although still exotic, ﬁscal federalism has been subject
of previous academic research. Importantly, however, it now appears to be a matter of serious
consideration within policy circles as well.
18Preference shocks include both inter- and intratemporal shocks, whereas technology shocks include the stationary
and the unit root technology shocks. The two measurement errors are also shown together. Moreover, for each variable
the table reports the decomposition with respect to local shocks. For instance, Portuguese variables are decomposed
across diﬀerent shocks originating in Portugal. All the remaining shocks are aggregated under the banner Abroad.
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4.1 Inspecting the Mechanism
Figure 1 presents the impulse responses of selected variables to a shock that raises the sovereign
spread by 10% in annual terms, as seen in Portugal during 2011. The increase in uncertainty re-
garding the ability of the government to service its debt lowers the value of government securities
and, therefore, raises the return on government bonds required by investors. As interest payments
become heavier, the government incurs a budget deﬁcit and the stock of public debt increases.
Under the baseline speciﬁcation, government expenditures do not respond to the cycle19, whereas
lump-sum taxes track the ratio of public debt to GDP. As such, taxes are automatically raised and
the government is induced to run a primary surplus. Comparing to the actual deﬁcit of 7.4% for
Portugal in 2011, the jump in the budget deﬁcit predicted by the model seems small. Note however
that between 2010 and 2013, taxes and social contributions fell by more than 2%, while unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, pensions, and other ﬁnancial liabilities all increased (European Commission, 2014).
Therefore, the baseline scenario serves as a lower bound in what respects the deteriorating eﬀects of
sovereign spread shocks on the ﬁscal stance.
As the price of government bonds plunges, bankers, who hold these securities in their
portfolios, see their total net worth contract. This triggers a jump in the leverage ratios of banks
that persists over time. In terms of magnitudes and recovery time, the model compares well with
reality. Using the loan-to-deposits ratio as a measure of leverage, the ﬁgure for Portuguese banks at
the beginning of 2011 was equal to 157%. It took 15 quarters to reach 117%, a fall of about 25% and
similar to Figure 1. Banks' equity also went through a slow recovery, with the average Core Tier
1 adjusting from 8.1% to 12% over the same period.20 Because of the leverage constraint, banks
are forced to reduce lending and to increase the premium on loans to private ﬁrms in order to build
up the value of their equity. In terms of the pass-through of sovereign spreads to ﬁrm's borrowing
costs, an increase of 10% in the former leads to a 3.5% increase in the latter.
The drop in credit supplied by banks and the increase in borrowing costs induce a collapse
in investment (of more than 10% at the trough). As ﬁrms face higher costs of capital, labour demand
also contracts and total employment falls. Consequently, real output falls, dropping more than 2% at
the trough. The marked contraction in domestic demand due to the fall in investment induces prices
to fall. However, given the small size of Portugal relative to the EMU, the nominal interest rate is
cut by less than 10 basis points. Clearly, monetary policy is not designed to address country-speciﬁc
shocks, with the negligible policy loosening doing nearly nothing to buﬀer the recession in Portugal.
Figure 1 also shows that higher ratios of public debt intensify the magnitude of the recession.
In fact, doubling of the stock of public debt leads to a fall in GDP more than twofold. When
domestic banks hold a larger stock of government securities in their balance sheets, a fall in the
price of sovereign bonds generates a relatively higher loss in their portfolio. As a consequence, the
premium between the risk free rate and the interest rate on loans to private ﬁrms can reach more
19As a matter of fact, government expenditures as a share of GDP are constant. As GDP falls, total government
expenditures will fall as well.
20Figures taken from European Commission (2014).
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than 3/4 of the spread originally generated on the sovereign rate. This number represents quite a
substantial pass-through. When public debt reaches 120% of GDP, the collapse in investment and
the drop in labour demand are sizeable too. Actual ﬁgures for Portugal were not any less impressive:
from 2011 to 2013, investment fell nearly 30%, while the unemployment rate went from 12.2% to
17.3%.
4.2 Constraints on Domestic Fiscal Policy
During the sovereign debt crisis, there was no room for counter-cyclical policy. European govern-
ments were forced to run sharp ﬁscal consolidation to avoid rampant sovereign interest rates, despite
the economic outlook remaining weak. In this respect, the model provides informative insights on
how sovereign interest rates and the ﬁscal outlook constrain the set of ﬁscal responses. Figure 2
shows the determinacy regions of the model for a range of parameter values governing ﬁscal policy,
given the ratio of public debt to annual GDP and the elasticity of sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal
outlook. In the ﬁgure, the values for κτ are within the range used in the literature (e.g. see Pappa,
2009); κg < 0 corresponds to the government running counter-cyclical policy; and regarding Θ,
the elasticity of sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal stance, I consider the range of values computed by
Corsetti et al. (2012). The white areas in the ﬁgure correspond to regions in the parameter space
for which public debt grows unbounded.
As shown in the left panel, as Θ increases, taxes need to react more swiftly to changes
in public debt in order to keep it away from an explosive path. Since higher spreads imply higher
deﬁcits, and deﬁcits lead to widening spreads, the government needs to raise taxes rapidly to avoid
further increases in sovereign interest rates.
The government can either raises taxes or lower public expenditure in order to control
public debt. The last panel to the right shows the trade-oﬀ between how government expenditure
can respond to the cycle and how taxes are used to control public debt. Firstly, counter-cyclical
policy is only possible when taxes are suﬃciently ﬁrm in targeting public debt. On the other hand,
pro-cyclical public spending is not enough, per se, to stabilize public debt either. In fact, the two
ﬁscal tools work through diﬀerent channels. While taxes reduce public debt directly, public spending
aﬀects GDP via a demand eﬀect.21 Consequently, spending alone might fail to bring sustainability
to the ratio of public debt to GDP.
Both grey areas in Figure 2 represent the determinacy regions of the model when the ratio
of public debt to annual GDP equals 60%. When this ratio equals 120%, determinacy only occurs
within the dark grey areas. As all panels attest, a higher stock of public debt requires ﬁscal discip-
line to be stricter. Importantly, the scope for counter-cyclical government expenditures is reduced
dramatically, as shown in the central panel. In particular, when Θ increases, the feedback eﬀects of
counter-cyclical expenditure on sovereign spreads dwarf any attempts to stimulate production via
public spending. In eﬀect, in these cases, counter-cyclical spending raises the ratio of public debt to
21In the case of taxes, the eﬀects on GDP are of second order and depend of households' consumption smoothing.
24
GDP unambiguously, therefore failing to keep it on a sustainable path.
Clearly, the ratio of public debt to annual GDP is key to determine the range of sustainable
ﬁscal policies that can be implemented by the government. As low debt countries are better placed
to use domestic ﬁscal policy as a tool to absorb idiosyncratic shocks, it is not surprising the emphasis
put on public debt and budget deﬁcit ﬁgures since the early stages of the EMU. Nevertheless, the
question remains: how should the EMU respond when countries experiencing ﬁscal strain cannot
use domestic ﬁscal policy to countervail the recessionary eﬀects of large asymmetric shocks?22
4.3 A Scheme of Fiscal Transfers: Symmetric Regions
In this section I use the estimated model to assess the welfare implications of a federal transfers
scheme (FTS) that has both countries operating transfers across the border when sovereign spreads
widen. Transfers from foreign to home are determined by the following simple rule
St = κs
(
log (δt)− log
(
δ
))
(44)
An equivalent expression deﬁnes the transfers to be made the opposite way.23 Importantly, the
parameter governing the magnitude of the transfers, κs, is equal for both countries. As all variables
in the model, including St and S
?
t , are deﬁned in per capita units, an equal κs implies an equal per
capita burden for home and foreign households. Transfers are collected by the government and are
made between governments.24 Hence, the expressions for the government budget in both countries
and for the net foreign assets have to be adjusted accordingly. The FTS proposed here addresses
directly the problem of ﬁscal strain due to sovereign spreads. As there is no direct transfers to
households or ﬁrms, the feedback to the real economy will be through taxation and public spending.
Importantly, the FTS will also feed-back to the real economy through its potential eﬀects on the
pass-through of sovereign spread shocks.
To contextualize my results, I start by considering a model where both regions have sym-
metric governments and are both subject to sovereign spread shocks. Crucially, I consider the case
when both regions have equal sizes and per capita GDP. In Table 6, the parameter values used for
the region labelled Periphery correspond to those estimated for Portugal, whereas the estimates for
22The model presented in the previous section, although providing an accurate illustration of how ﬁscal policy
can run into indeterminacy, it is not especially gifted to analyse optimal government spending. On the one hand,
government spending is not productive nor utility enhancing in the model. On the other hand, automatic stabilizers,
such as unemployment beneﬁts, are absent. That is partly the reason why pro-cyclical public expenditure might be
welfare improving for some parametrization in Figure 4. Integrating these elements in the model is left for future
research.
23By deﬁnition, transfers are only temporary, being equal to zero in the long-run.
24In this paper I assume δt is observable and, therefore, can be used to guide policy. In reality, however, sovereign
spread shocks might be diﬃcult to measure. Importantly, it might also be the case that optimal transfers do not
respond to all swings in sovereign spreads as measured, for instance, by the diﬀerentials in government bond yields in
the secondary market. It is also not clear that targeting a more fundamental measure, such as public debt to annual
GDP, solves the problem. I leave these questions for future research.
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the Eurozone are used for the region labelled Core. The FTS is deﬁned by the value of κs that
maximizes the aggregate welfare of the monetary union, that is, the sum of each region's welfare
weighted by its population size. I follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and express welfare gains
in terms of certainty-equivalent consumption. First, I compute each country's welfare for a given
set of allocations
{
ckt , l
k
t
}∞
t=0
, where k corresponds to a particular value of τs ∈ R+0 . I then compare
it to the case of no ﬁscal transfers, deﬁning the welfare gain λ˜ as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
((
1 + λ˜
)
c0t , l
0
t
)
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ckt , l
k
t
)
(45)
For positive values of λ˜, there are gains from implementing the FTS. Welfare is computed up to a
second order of approximation from the unconditional expected lifetime utility.
Table 6 reports the welfare gains from both regions engaging in the FTS. In the ﬁrst column
I report the baseline case where the two regions diﬀer only in terms of the estimated parameters. The
results show that the FTS is welfare improving for each region individually. This is an important
ﬁnding because it states clearly the mutual beneﬁts of both members entering the FTS. Interestingly,
the Core is the region beneﬁting the most, with a 4% increase in permanent consumption. The
diﬀerence in welfare gains between the two regions is largely explained by the diﬀerence in the set
of estimated parameters.25
However, the distribution of welfare gains and their magnitude can vary easily depending
on small asymmetries between the two regions, and in particular when the ﬁscal outlooks diﬀer. For
example, the second column shows that when public debt to GDP is twice as big in the Periphery
as it is in the Core, welfare gains fall for the former, whereas they increase for the latter. Note that,
up to the value of κs, the transfers are identical to the baseline scenario given that they only depend
upon the sovereign spread shocks. Moreover, using the same κs = 7.27 as in the baseline, the Core
still beneﬁts more from entering the FTS with a Periphery with higher debt. Inspecting the reasons
behind these results, I ﬁnd that transfers do not do enough to counteract the magnifying eﬀects of
public debt on real ﬂuctuations in the Periphery, whereas the additional gains to the Core stem from
the feedback eﬀects on the real exchange rate, as seen in Figure 1.
The third column reports the case when sovereign spreads respond to the ﬁscal outlook in
the Periphery. For a given κs, setting Θ 6= 0 increases the persistence of sovereign spread shocks. As
a result, transfers between countries become asymmetric, with those incoming to the Periphery being
more prolonged in time than those incoming to the Core. This, together with the fact that spread
shocks have a greater impact on real activity when Θ 6= 0, explain the substantial welfare gains of
the FTS to the Periphery. On the contrary, the gains for the Core disappear, clearly driven by the
disproportionate costs of outgoing transfers to the Periphery relative to the beneﬁts of incoming
transfers. If I assume instead that Θ? = Θ, the FTS becomes again welfare improving for both
25The other factors behind the discrepancy between welfare gains are the risk premium on the interest rate on
foreign bonds charged to home households and the asymmetry caused by the fact that the policy rate is the foreign
nominal rate.
26
regions (results not shown in the table).
The next two columns inspect the consequences of ﬁscal policy in the Periphery. When taxes
respond less to public debt, ﬁscal deﬁcits and public debt ﬂuctuate more. Hence, after a sovereign
spread shock, as banks accommodate the increase in government debt, which in turn becomes less
valuable, the pass-through is magniﬁed. As transfers stabilize public debt, the welfare gains from the
FTS for the Periphery increase. On the contrary, counter-cyclical government expenditures narrow
the beneﬁts in both regions. In the Periphery, the impact of incoming transfers in stimulating output
is marginal when the government is already carrying counter-cyclical policy (even when considering
their positive impact in stabilizing debt). On the other hand, the losses caused by outgoing transfers
due to the FTS are further magniﬁed by ﬁscal policy.26
Finally, the last column in Table 6 investigates the case when the volatility of sovereign
spreads in the Core is reduced to 95% of that seen in the Periphery. The welfare eﬀects are strikingly
clear: the Core has no advantage in joining the FTS, whereas the Periphery has additional gains. The
results are not surprising; but the fact that a relatively small drop in the volatility of spread shocks
produces such an antagonistic result is symptomatic of the challenges posed to the implementation
of a FTS between diﬀerent regions. The discussion that follows is dominated by this diﬃculty in
supporting a FTS that causes welfare losses for some of its participants.
4.4 A Scheme of Fiscal Transfers: Asymmetric Regions
Aggregate welfare is a good measure to assess the potential beneﬁts of international ﬁscal transfers.
However, it might be politically (and socially) impracticable to convince one country to participate
in a FTS that reduces its own welfare. Therefore, rather than searching for the FTS that maximizes
aggregate welfare, it is advisable to look at the welfare eﬀects for each country individually. In
this light, it turns out that modelling two countries with diﬀerent sizes constitutes a challenge. In
a nutshell, when the two countries diﬀer in size, equal per capita transfers imply necessarily an
asymmetric aggregate ﬂow of transfers between countries. The greater is the discrepancy in relative
sizes, the more (less) impact ﬁscal transfers have for welfare in the small (big) country.
To clarify the importance of relative sizes, I use again the model with symmetric regions
Core and Periphery and run the following exercise: First, I consider only FTS for which the value of
κs maximizes aggregate welfare. I then compute the minimum relative size of the Periphery, n, for
which entering the FTS has no negative eﬀects to the Core. Figure 3 illustrates this exercise. The
minimum value I obtain is n = 48.72%, which plainly shows how easy the support for a FTS can
break down due to asymmetries between countries. As transfers are calculated in per capita terms,
their aggregate levels change one-to-one with n. Although the per capita burden of engaging in a
FTS with a smaller country diminish with n, the per capita beneﬁts vanish more rapidly.
Conversely, one important aspect conveyed in the previous exercise concerns the potentially
large gains small countries can secure from entering a FTS. In fact, if I were interested more broadly
26Note that public spending in our model is not utility enhancing, as discussed in a previous note.
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in FTS that generate a positive gain in aggregate welfare, despite reducing welfare in one region in
particular, the minimum value of n sustaining a positive κs would be substantially lower. I therefore
return to the model I have estimated and conduct another experiment. Suppose that to implement
a FTS, all countries have to beneﬁt from welfare gains derived from being part of a monetary union
with ﬁscal transfers. That is, suppose ﬁrst that entering the monetary union implies a gain of α˜ in
terms of lifetime consumption to all its members. A FTS can then be implemented as long as its
welfare costs are smaller than α˜. In other words, the alternative is not between implementing a FTS
or not, but rather between a monetary union with a FTS and leaving the union altogether.
Welfare costs and beneﬁts from entering a monetary union have been studied in the liter-
ature and I take a passive stance here by simply adopting existing estimates. On the negative side,
the costs associated with entering a monetary union relate to the lack of synchronization between
individual countries' business cycles. Among others, the costs arise from asymmetric shock to tech-
nology and ﬁscal policy, home bias in consumption, and incomplete ﬁnancial markets. However, a
growing literature is quantifying the extent to which trade and ﬁnancial integration can oﬀ-set these
losses. For instance, Lama and Rabanal (2014) show that a fall in trade costs, which they consider
to be of a conservative magnitude, is responsible for a 1.2% increase in permanent consumption.
However, if they include the business cycle costs of the common currency, they obtain a welfare loss.
Auray et al. (2010) study the welfare eﬀects of an increase in trade ﬂows between member countries
of around 10%. They show that trade integration can account for an increase of more than 7% in
permanent consumption in an economy with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, and that the beneﬁts
from trade could reach more than 10% of lifetime consumption if ﬁnancial markets are complete.
Also focusing on the level of ﬁnancial markets integration, Lama and Rabanal (2014) run a rough
experiment and assume that the EMU induces a sharp reduction in the volatility of private risk
premium due an increase banks' risk pooling. Under this scenario, they calculate the welfare gains
from entering the union to be higher than 2% of permanent consumption.
For the purpose of my experiment, I focus on two scenarios for which entering a monetary
union brings welfare beneﬁts to its members due to gains from trade. The more conservative scenario
assumes a 1% increase in lifetime consumption, whereas the second scenario has a more optimistic
conjecture of a 5% increase in permanent consumption. I make two more assumptions. First, I
conjecture that welfare gains are identical across all member countries. Second, I suppose that the
gains from trade are proportional to the size of each country entering the union. With these two
assumptions, a country of size n is responsible for a permanent consumption increase of (n/ (1− n))×
α˜ to all the remaining member countries of the union.
Table 7 shows the welfare eﬀects of the FTS under the two scenarios. Under the assumption
of a 1% gain derived from trade integration, Portugal could secure a 1.44% increase in lifetime
consumption from the implementation of the FTS. In the optimistic scenario, the gain jumps to
7.8%. Table 7 also reports an approximation to the potential beneﬁts bigger countries could secure
from the FTS. Using the estimated parameters for Portugal, I recalibrate the size n of the home
country and the ratio of per capita GDP to match Spain and Italy. This is a simple conjecture
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since the parameter estimates are likely to diﬀer across countries. Notwithstanding this caveat, the
results show that for a fraction of the beneﬁts derived from trade integration, welfare gains for the
Periphery of the EMU are large.
The experiments reported in Table 7 serve to illustrate the magnitude of welfare changes
involved with the implementation of the FTS. In particular, it shows that the smaller the recipient
country is, the higher the potential gains it can obtain. In fact, even if the beneﬁts from trade
integration linked to the inclusion of a small country in the union were smaller than the conservative
scenario, the positive impact on its welfare would still be substantial. The scheme has its limitations
however. For instance, big countries like Germany, which represents less than 48% of the union, but
signiﬁcantly more than the 18% of Italy, would be unable to secure gains of the same magnitude
as those reported in the table. Germany falls in a grey area: it is too big to beneﬁt from sizeable
welfare gains at the expense of the rest of the union, and too small to engage in a FTS that improves
welfare everywhere as seen in Table 5.
As shown in Table 7, the welfare beneﬁts for Portugal change modestly regardless of its
domestic ﬁscal stance and policy. In Table 8, the value of κs is computed such that the Eurozone
loses (n/ (1− n)) × 1% in permanent consumption. Clearly, the small size of Portugal explains
the negligible variations in the values of κs. Notwithstanding that Tables 6 and 8 were built under
diﬀerent assumption, both sets of results are coherent. For instance, when Θ 6= 0, κs falls so that the
welfare losses for the Eurozone remain constant. On the other hand, welfare beneﬁts are maximized
when Portuguese ﬁscal policy is less strict, with taxes responding more weakly to public debt.
I have focused on the substantial welfare gains a federal transfer mechanism can generate.
However, it is important to acknowledge that the implementation of the FTS requires some countries
to forego a fraction of the initial gains obtained from entering the EMU. That is, the political support
for the implementation of a transfers arrangement can not, by any means, be taken for granted. Yet,
important considerations linked to spillover eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks are, at least partially,
absent from the model. In reality, the destabilizing eﬀects of the European sovereign debt crisis
were also felt in the Core of the EMU, where contagion was addressed seriously. For instance, in
the model banks do not engage in international intermediation. As such, considerations regarding
the systemic risk one country's banking sector poses to area-wide stability are mute. Dedola et al.
(2013) show that country speciﬁc shocks aﬀecting the domestic banking sector are transmitted to
foreign banks when there is ﬁnancial integration, thus requiring policy coordination to buﬀer shocks
eﬃciently. Clearly, these channels have direct implications for the welfare of current net losers from
the FTS. Including such considerations in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of the FTS could induce wider
support for a transfer scheme in these countries.
On the other hand, the push for the implementation of a Fiscal Union in Europe is faced
with concerns over the risk of moral hazard and free riding.27 Some steps to mitigate these fears have
been alluded to in the 5 Presidents Report (Juncker et al., 2015), where the authors defend three
27Although most times not made explicit, these concerns are nonetheless evident in, for instance, Juncker et al.
(2015).
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important prerequisites for the implementation of the Fiscal Union: (i) the economic convergence
of the member states, which will increase the synchronization of business cycles, (ii) the enactment
of ﬁscal rules that guarantee the sustainability of domestic ﬁscal accounts, which as a by-product
will enable domestic ﬁscal policy to react to asymmetric shocks, and (iii) the guarantee that the
interventions under the FTS have only a temporary nature.
Regarding the ﬁrst point, as member states' business cycles become more synchronized,
the lower are the costs of a single monetary policy with ﬁxed exchange rates (see, for instance, Rose
2008). As such, and as discussed above, the higher the beneﬁts from being part of the union, the
easier it will be to grant support for the implementation of a FTS. Considering point (ii), I have
rationalized how domestic ﬁscal policy is endogenously constrained by the ﬁscal outlook and how
ﬁscal conditions can compromise the leeway needed for domestic policy to buﬀer spread shocks.
One important dimension that remains to be addressed concerns how domestic policy should be
conducted in an environment with transfers. As I have shown, the political support for a FTS
between countries rests on how asymmetric ﬁscal conditions are. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to draw on potential conditionalities involved with a FTS to enforce ﬁscal prudence. The model
can, nevertheless, provide an accurate benchmark to think about the design of a Fiscal Union, and
certainly is a good starting point for further research.28 Finally, the FTS proposed in this paper
satisﬁes point (iii) by construction.
4.5 Dynamics and Fiscal Policy
In this section, I compare the eﬀects of domestic counter-cyclical policy, on the one hand, and of
international ﬁscal transfers, on the other, to the transmission of sovereign spread shocks. I construct
Figure 4 in the following way: I begin by assuming that Portugal and the Eurozone engage in a FTS
deﬁned by κs = 0.05. Secondly, I calculate the magnitude of the pass-through of sovereign shocks
to the private risk premium under the FTS. I then compute the value of κg that, in the absence of
the FTS, results in having an equal pass-through as the one calculated in the second step. In other
words, I match the eﬀects of sovereign spread shocks on the borrowing costs of private ﬁrms between
the two policies.
As Figure 4 shows, both policies reduce the pass-through of sovereign spread shocks to
private spreads. Although the fall in the price of government bonds is equal regardless of having any
policy in place, the net worth of banks falls less in the presence of counter-cyclical policy and the
28Two aspects are particularly relevant. One the one hand, time inconsistent behaviour can severely aﬀect the
implementation of inter-governmental transfers. This can be due to the impossibility to enforce structural reforms and
ﬁscal prudence on a sovereign nation facing ﬁscal stress. If reforms and/or consolidation are not properly executed, the
need for foreign transfers might persist, the positive spillovers from improving the ﬁscal stance might not materialize
and the distribution of welfare gains from the FTS can skew easily. The same is true with respect to the donating
country, which might be better-oﬀ not making a transfer when its fellow union member requires. On the other hand,
but still related, alternative transfer rules to (44) might altogether improve the potential to implement a FTS. For
instance, a mechanism that encompasses automatic reforms as well as transfers has the potential to maximize the
positive externalities of risk-sharing at the same time as reducing the risks of moral hazard and free riding. These
aspects, although extremely relevant, are left for future research.
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FTS. This eﬀect is due to the stimulus in aggregate demand generated by both policies, which feeds
into an increasing demand for capital from private ﬁrms. Despite the fact that banks increase the
risk premium in order to rebuild their net worth, the stimulus moderates the fall in the demand for
credit and allows banks to reduce the pass-through. Consequently, the fall in investment is lessened
as well as is the recession, which at the trough becomes nearly 1% milder.
Interestingly, the response of GDP diﬀers between the two policies. Under counter-cyclical
government expenditures the trough is more pronounced but the recovery is faster. With the FTS,
the fall in GDP and its eventual recovery are more gradual. The same applies to employment, with
the recovery under the FTS taking even longer than what would otherwise happen without any
policy at place.
Clearly, the two policies are not equivalent. With counter-cyclical policy, the deﬁcit grows
further and stays higher for longer. With the FTS, the magnitude of the initial jump is very similar
to the baseline scenario, as is its evolution towards the steady state. The similar dynamics of the
deﬁcit under the FTS and the baseline are due to the fact that, as GDP contracts less under the
FTS, the increase in taxes needed to control public debt is also smaller. In eﬀect, ﬁscal transfers
substitute, at least partially, the need for domestic taxation.
In terms of aggregate demand, the FTS generates an indirect stimulus through the need
for less taxation, whereas with counter-cyclical policy there is a reshue in domestic demand, with
government expenditure leading the stimulus. Instead of crowding out other domestic sources of
aggregate demand, the FTS appears to be a more eﬃcient stimulus measure. One indicator sup-
porting this claim is inﬂation, which reacts considerably less compared to the other two scenarios.
This is due to the impact of ﬁscal transfers on the real exchange rate, which mitigates the need for
a domestic devaluation and reduces the ineﬃciencies caused by price changes.
The diﬀerences in the operating mechanisms of counter-cyclical policy and the FTS are
made patently clear when I make sovereign spreads elastic to the ﬁscal outlook. In Figure 5 I take
the same values for κs and κg as before, but assume instead that Θ = 0.05, that is, that sovereign
spreads react to the ratio of public debt to GDP. In this scenario, sovereign spread shocks vanish
relatively slower. Considering counter-cyclical policy, the spread banks charge to ﬁrms actually
increases when compared to the baseline. Yet, employment and GDP still perform better when
compared to the no policy scenario, with the demand eﬀect lead by the government supporting
real activity despite the negative impact on banks. The key for this apparently counter-intuitive
result lies in the behaviour of asset prices. The price of government bonds falls more abruptly when
the government runs an expansion, causing the net-worth of banks to contract more than in the
absence of policy. The evolution in the price of government bonds explains why banks are unable to
reduce the pass-through of sovereign spreads to the private sector. As before, the FTS outperforms
domestic counter-cyclical policy and, most importantly, does not cause the perverse eﬀects on the
supply of credit to the economy.
Figure 4 presents, at least partially, the trade oﬀ of domestic counter-cyclical policy. For
some parametrization of the model, counter-cyclical policy can be welfare improving, insofar as it
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supports economic activity, reduces inﬂation and the miss-allocation of resources. However, the
elasticity of sovereign spreads can invert these results and potentially cause a deeper recession.
There are, however, important features missing in the model. On the one hand, public expenditures
have no productive nor utility enhancing use. On the other hand, taxation is modelled in a very
reduced form. A study of optimal domestic public policy in an environment with sovereign spreads
and international transfers has to address these aspects. It is left for future research.
5 Conclusion
The recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has tested the resilience of the most ambitious supra-
national endeavour seen in the old continent. The viability of the common currency, and of European
integration itself, has been openly threatened. The central question has concerned the type and
extent of the response the monetary union should give to asymmetric shocks to its member countries.
Related to this is yet the question of what level of solidarity can be reasonably expected between
members. The answers so far have been in the direction of more integration and discipline, with
the Banking Union and the Fiscal Compact being just some examples. Looking ahead, however, the
completion of a fully ﬂedged monetary union requires some form of ﬁscal arrangement at the federal
level as well. After all, it was the inability of domestic ﬁscal policy to tackle sovereign spread shocks
in the countries most aﬀected by the crisis that sparked the severe tensions seen within the EMU.
In this paper, I set up and estimate a model capable of providing a consistent narrative
of the crisis. The model features ﬁnancial frictions due to leverage constraints on banks which link
the availability of credit to productive ﬁrms to the value of bank's net worth. Domestic banks are
also the suppliers of credit to the government, therefore being exposed to sovereign credit risk. I
illustrate the mechanisms at work during a sovereign spread shock and compare its dynamic eﬀects
to the case of Portugal in 2011. I show that the ratio of public debt to GDP and the elasticity
of sovereign spreads to the ﬁscal outlook can substantially magnify the pass-through of sovereign
spreads to private borrowers. I also show that counter-cyclical policy is not feasible when sovereign
spreads react sharply to a deterioration in public ﬁnances and the debt burden is at the levels seen
in the periphery of the Eurozone during the crisis.
I contribute to the debate about a future ﬁscal capacity at the EMU level. I propose a
simple ﬁscal transfer scheme between member countries triggered when sovereign spreads widen.
The scheme acts at the root of the transmission mechanism of spread shocks by alleviating the ﬁscal
strain on the government. At the same time, it provides a stimulus to real activity and reduces the
impact of sovereign spreads on private lending rates. The ﬁscal arrangement I propose improves
welfare when countries have symmetric structures, and in particular when the relative size of their
economies and the proﬁle of their ﬁscal stances is almost identical. However, asymmetries across
countries induce welfare losses for some members. As a result, the proposed transfers scheme can
easily lose political support for its implementation. Nevertheless, I demonstrate through a simple
exercise that the welfare gains for a small country, like those at the core of the recent crisis, can
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be large. Importantly, I show that these gains can be sustained through a scheme under which the
costs for the remaining members of the union is signiﬁcantly smaller than the beneﬁts they secure
by sharing the common currency.
This paper provides a realistic set up where asymmetric shocks to a currency union are
addressed via a supra-national scheme of ﬁscal transfers. It shows the large potential gains derived
from a simple, reduced form scheme and highlights the fragilities regarding its implementation.
Further research needs to investigate the mechanisms by which these fragilities can be reduced.
Namely it should explore the spillover consequences of localized asymmetric shocks and understand
the role of policy coordination and enforceability at the national level.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Elasticity of substitution Home and Foreign goods γ 1.00
Capital share on production α 0.36
Steady state depreciation rate σ 0.025
Elasticity of capital utilization ı 1.71
Elasticity of substitution across types of goods µp 11
Elasticity of substitution across types of labour µw 6
Private ﬁrms' risk premium rx − rh 0.01
Steady state leverage ratio φ 4
Fraction of divertable assets ι 0.35
Start-up funds of new banks  0.0038
Banker survival probability λf 0.975
Steady state sovereign spread δ 0.002
Home's population share n 0.03
Foreign to Home per capita GDP gdp
?
/gdp 1.7
Degree of home bias in Home ω 0.7
Degree of home bias in Foreign ω? 0.9945
Steady state Government Expenditure to GDP g˜ 0.2
Steady state labour supply l 0.33
Weight on labour disutility ζ 18.86
Steady state Government Debt to GDP d˜g 0.6
Sovereign spread elasticity Θ 0
Fiscal response to public debt κτ 0.15
Government Expenditure response to GDP κg 0
Fiscal transfer scheme κs 0
Share of consumption taxes in revenue κc 0.4
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Table 2: Estimation: model parameters
prior posterior
parameter pdf mean s.d. spec. 1 spec. 2 spec. 3
Habit persistence % gamma 0.50 0.10 0.51 0.52 0.76
(0.39 , 0.63) (0.40 , 0.63) (0.69 , 0.84)
Habit persistence %? gamma 0.50 0.10 0.54 0.55 0.86
(0.39 , 0.67) (0.40 , 0.70) (0.80 , 0.91)
Inv. elast. of labour supply ϕ gamma 1.00 0.25 0.82 0.81 0.80
(0.46 , 1.15) (0.47 , 1.16) (0.46 , 1.11)
Inv. elast. of labour supply ϕ? gamma 1.00 0.25 1.02 0.99 1.39
(0.64 , 1.42) (0.60 , 1.38) (0.96 , 1.81)
Investment adjust. costs ψ gamma 2.00 1.00 3.45 3.20 4.59
(2.11 , 4.79) (1.89 , 4.56) (3.22 , 5.92)
Investment adjust. costs ψ? gamma 2.00 1.00 2.57 2.57 10.64
(1.11 , 4.05) (1.14 , 3.92) (7.51 , 13.68)
Price stickiness λp beta 0.75 0.05 0.78 0.78 0.76
(0.73 , 0.83) (0.73 , 0.83) (0.70 , 0.83)
Price stickiness λp? beta 0.75 0.05 0.71 0.71 0.81
(0.63 , 0.79) (0.63 , 0.78) (0.78 , 0.85)
Indexation to past inﬂation ϑ beta 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08
(0.02 , 0.18) (0.02 , 0.17) (0.01 , 0.15)
Indexation to past inﬂation ϑ? beta 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.02
(0.02 , 0.21) (0.02 , 0.20) (0.01 , 0.03)
Wage stickiness λw beta 0.75 0.05 0.69 0.69 0.75
(0.63 , 0.75) (0.64 , 0.78) (0.69 , 0.78)
Wage stickiness λw? beta 0.75 0.05 0.82 0.81 0.54
(0.76 , 0.89) (0.76 , 0.87) (0.49 , 0.60)
Interest rate smoothing ρi beta 0.75 0.10 0.83 0.83 0.95
(0.80 , 0.86) (0.80 , 0.86) (0.94 , 0.96)
Taylor rule inﬂation ρpi normal 1.70 0.20 1.69 1.69 1.69
(1.44 , 1.93) (1.44 , 1.92) (1.40 , 1.98)
Taylor rule GDP growth ρy normal 0.20 0.10 0.52 0.51 0.22
(0.40 , 0.64) (0.39 , 0.63) (0.06 , 0.38)
Cost of foreign position Γ inv. gamma 0.001 0.005 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0002 , 0.001) (0.0003 , 0.001) (0.0003 , 0.001)
Parameters with ? are for the Euro Area, the remaining are for Portugal. Note that there is a common
Taylor rule for both regions. The table reports the posterior mean estimates and the 90% credible set.
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Table 3: Estimation: persistence parameters
prior posterior
parameter pdf mean s.d. spec. 1 spec. 2 spec. 3
Intratemporal preferences ρl beta 0.75 0.10 0.34 0.34 0.39
(0.23 , 0.47) (0.22 , 0.46) (0.26 , 0.53)
Intratemporal preferences ρl? beta 0.75 0.10 0.66 0.68 0.95
(0.49 , 0.83) (0.54 , 0.82) (0.89 , 0.99)
Intertemporal preferences ρc beta 0.75 0.10 0.89 0.89 0.90
(0.83 , 0.96) (0.83 , 0.96) (0.82 , 0.98)
Intertemporal preferences ρc? beta 0.75 0.10 0.85 0.85 0.54
(0.79 , 0.93) (0.77 , 0.93) (0.37 , 0.70)
Stationary technology ρs beta 0.75 0.10 0.73 0.72 0.97
(0.56 , 0.90) (0.56 , 0.90) (0.96 , 0.99)
Stationary technology ρs? beta 0.75 0.10 0.66 0.67 0.82
(0.46 , 0.86) (0.47 , 0.86) (0.73 , 0.91)
Investment technology ρz beta 0.75 0.10 0.44 0.44 0.74
(0.30 , 0.59) (0.29 , 0.58) (0.65 , 0.84)
Investment technology ρz? beta 0.75 0.10 0.64 0.64 0.75
(0.53 , 0.75) (0.54 , 0.74) (0.62 , 0.89)
Cost-push ρλp beta 0.75 0.10 0.72 0.72 0.74
(0.57 , 0.87) (0.58 , 0.86) (0.58 , 0.90)
Cost-push ρλp? beta 0.75 0.10 0.69 0.69 0.72
(0.50 , 0.87) (0.52 , 0.87) (0.57 , 0.89)
Government expenditure ρg beta 0.75 0.10 0.94 0.79 0.94
(0.91 , 0.97) (0.70 , 0.87) (0.91 , 0.98)
Government expenditure ρg? beta 0.75 0.10 0.94 0.92 0.90
(0.90 , 0.98) (0.88 , 0.96) (0.85 , 0.95)
Sovereign risk premium ρδ beta 0.75 0.10 0.92 0.92 0.93
(0.89 , 0.96) (0.89 , 0.96) (0.90 , 0.97)
Measurement error (h) ρe beta 0.75 0.10 0.84 - -
(0.77 , 0.90)
Measurement error (f) ρe? beta 0.75 0.10 0.90 - -
(0.86 , 0.95)
Parameters with ? are for the Euro Area, the remaining are for Portugal. Note that there is a common
Taylor rule for both regions. The table reports the posterior mean estimates and the 90% credible set.
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Table 4: Estimation: standard deviations
prior posterior
parameter pdf mean s.d. spec. 1 spec. 2 spec. 3
Intratemporal preferences σl gamma 0.200 0.150 0.470 0.465 0.676
(0.248 , 0.677) (0.258 , 0.667) (0.382 , 0.962)
Intratemporal preferences σl? gamma 0.200 0.150 0.304 0.242 0.048
(0.066 , 0.714) (0.081 , 0.420) (0.033 , 0.066)
Intertemporal preferences σc gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.022 0.022 0.051
(0.016 , 0.027) (0.016 , 0.028) (0.037 , 0.065)
Intertemporal preferences σc? gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.013 0.013 0.035
(0.009 , 0.017) (0.009 , 0.018) (0.023 , 0.047)
Stationary technology σs gamma 0.020 0.015 0.020 0.020 0.064
(0.001 , 0.039) (0.001 , 0.039) (0.043 , 0.086)
Stationary technology σs? gamma 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.172
(0.001 , 0.017) (0.002 , 0.016) (0.128 , 0.215)
Investment technology σz gamma 0.050 0.045 0.146 0.134 0.127
(0.093 , 0.200) (0.082 , 0.187) (0.094 , 0.160)
Investment technology σz? gamma 0.050 0.045 0.041 0.041 0.059
(0.025 , 0.059) (0.025 , 0.057) (0.025 , 0.094)
Cost-push σλp gamma 0.020 0.015 0.052 0.052 0.015
(0.012 , 0.085) (0.015 , 0.085) (0.001 , 0.029)
Cost-push σλp? gamma 0.020 0.015 0.008 0.007 0.013
(0.001 , 0.016) (0.001 , 0.014) (0.001 , 0.025)
Government expenditure σg gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.013 0.053 0.013
(0.011 , 0.014) (0.046 , 0.059) (0.011 , 0.015)
Government expenditure σg? gamma 0.010 0.0075 0.008 0.023 0.024
(0.007 , 0.010) (0.020 , 0.026) (0.020 , 0.027)
Monetary shock σi gamma 0.001 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.001 , 0.001) (0.001 , 0.001) (0.002 , 0.003)
Sovereign risk premium σδ gamma 0.020 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.014 , 0.019) (0.014 , 0.019) (0.014 , 0.018)
Trend technology σu gamma 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.02
(0.006 , 0.011) (0.006 , 0.010) (0.015 , 0.025)
Measurement error (h) σe gamma 0.005 0.0015 0.008 - -
(0.007 , 0.009)
Measurement error (f) σe? gamma 0.005 0.0015 0.004 - -
(0.003 , 0.005)
marginal likelihood (Laplace) 3678.76 3214.72 2817.20
marginal likelihood (Harmonic mean) 3681.30 3216.74 2819.07
average acceptance rate 0.29 0.32 0.34
Parameters with ? are for the Euro Area, the remaining are for Portugal. Note that there is a common
Taylor rule for both regions. The table reports the posterior mean estimates and the 90% credible set.
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Table 5: Variance Decomposition
data model Pref. Tech. Inv. Gov. C.P. Mon. Def. Abroad M.E.
∆gdp 1.03 1.16 19.2 17.2 45.1 2.2 1.4 9.7 1.0 3.5 0.7
∆gdp? 0.68 1.05 6.5 35.4 38.1 2.0 7.1 10.5 0.0 0.0 0.6
∆c 1.14 1.09 84.2 9.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 2.4 0.0 3.3 0.0
∆c? 0.55 0.60 45.9 27.8 15.7 1.2 2.2 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
∆z 4.44 4.03 2.4 3.1 83.8 0.0 1.1 4.1 2.1 3.2 0.0
∆z? 2.31 2.81 2.6 22.5 62.8 0.1 5.6 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆g 1.24 1.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆g? 0.84 0.76 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
∆w 1.37 0.68 72.2 21.3 1.3 0.0 3.1 0.2 0.0 1.9 0.0
∆w? 0.29 0.37 15.5 51.4 12.2 0.2 17.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.1
∆pi 0.44 0.40 18.6 24.5 5.1 0.2 3.6 13.9 0.2 33.8 0.1
∆pi? 0.29 0.34 9.7 20.8 35.3 0.7 16.8 16.4 0.0 0.0 0.2
ib 0.60 0.58 0.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 60.6 33.3 0.1
i? 0.43 0.36 8.9 12.6 70.6 1.4 1.9 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.3
Standard deviations are in percent. Standard deviations implied by the model and the uncon-
ditional variance decomposition are performed at the posterior mean estimates of the model's
parameters. Shocks are aggregated as explained in the main text.
Table 6: Two Equal-sized Regions
dg 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Θ 0 0 0.01 0 0 0
κt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.2
κg 0 0 0 0 -0.05 0
σ?δ σδ σδ σδ σδ σδ 0.95× σδ
welfare gains (% CE consumption)
κs 7.27 7.88 8.99 7.58 4.04 7.27
Core 4.08 4.50 0.00 4.08 1.49 -3.95
Periphery 0.72 0.49 5.76 0.88 0.33 8.91
The table reports unconditional welfare gains measured as % of certainty equi-
valent consumption. The values of κs reported correspond to the maximizers
of aggregated welfare, assuming n = 0.5 and gdp?/gdp = 1. Unless otherwise
stated, d?g = 0.6, Θ
? = 0, κ?t = 0.2, κ
?
g = 0.
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Table 7: One Small Open Country in a Wider Monetary Union
n 3% 12% 18%
gdp?/gdp 1.7 1.2 1
dg 0.6 0.6 0.6
Θ 0 0 0
κt 0.2 0.2 0.2
κg 0 0 0
welfare gains (% CE consumption)
trade gains of 1% CE consumption
κs 0.006 0.018 0.023
Eurozone -0.03 -0.14 -0.22
Periphery 1.44 1.05 0.86
trade gains of 5% CE consumption
κs 0.032 0.091 0.115
Eurozone -0.15 -0.68 -1.09
Periphery 7.80 5.38 4.44
The table reports unconditional welfare gains measured as %
of certainty equivalent consumption. The values of κs are such
that the welfare losses of the Eurozone are no bigger that the
trade gains corresponding to the Periphery entering the union
(assuming trade gains are equal across all union members).
Table 8: The Case of Portugal
n 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
gdp?/gdp 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
dg 0.6 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.6
Θ 0 0 0.01 0 0
κt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
κg 0 0 0 0 -0.05
welfare gains (% CE consumption)
κs 0.0064 0.0064 0.0060 0.0064 0.0064
Eurozone -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 -0.031
Portugal 1.515 1.521 1.521 1.535 1.575
The table reports unconditional welfare gains measured as %
of certainty equivalent consumption. The values of κs are such
that the welfare losses of the Eurozone are no bigger that the
trade gains corresponding to Portugal entering the union.
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Figure 1: Responses to a Sovereign Spread Shock
Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady state, except for the governmnet
deﬁcit and net exports, which are expressed in levels. Default values of κt = 0.15, κg = 0 and Θ = 0.
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Figure 2: Determinacy Regions
κt: elasticity of taxes to government debt to GDP, κg: responce of government expenditures to GDP and
Θ: elasticity of sovereign spread to the ﬁscal outlook. Grey areas represent determinacy regions. Both
areas represent determinacy when government debt to annual GDP equals 60%. For government debt to
annual GDP of 120%, determinacy only occurs within the dark grey areas. Default values of κt = 0.15,
κg = 0 and Θ = 0.
Figure 3: Welfare in a (almost) Symmetric World*
*Estimated parameters and standard deviations diﬀer across regions. Besides assuming gdp?/gdp = 1, the
Core is assumed to have a government sector identical to the Periphery, including sovereign spread shocks.
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Figure 4: Dynamic Impact of Fiscal Policy (Θ = 0)
Figure 5: Dynamic Impact of Fiscal Policy (Θ = 0.05)
Impulse responses are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady state, except for the governmnet
deﬁcit, which is expressed in levels. Default values of κt = 0.2 and public debt to annual GDP of 60%.
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